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Abstract. The paper analyses and evaluates, from a comparative perspective, the recent developments in the 
treatment of resale price fi xing (RPF) in EU competition law. It inquires whether, as to the treatment of RPF, EU 
competition law is in line with US antitrust after the changes introduced by the 2010 regulatory package; and 
demonstrates that considerable differences exist. The paper concludes that the 2010 revision of the rules on vertical 
restraints somewhat refi ned but did not reform the law on RPF. The new rules ignore the transaction costs and 
realities of competition assessment and balancing. It is submitted that in EU competition law the main problem is 
that, conceptually, the question of RPF has been pushed in the pigeonhole of Article 101(3). The paper argues that 
the Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance should be amended so as to cover agreements containing RPF 
where market share is low.
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A) Introduction
Probably, one of the most controversial substantive issue facing antitrust/competition law is 
the treatment of resale price fi xing (RPF).1 It is noteworthy that this is one of the questions 
where the world’s two leading antitrust jurisdictions fundamentally diverge.
* Ph.D., Associate professor and department head, Private International Law Department, 
University of Szeged, H-6722 Szeged, Rákóczi tér 1; associate professor, Budapest University of 
Technology and Economics, H-1111 Budapest, Műegyetem rkp. 3–9.
E-mail: nagycs@juris.u-szeged.hu
** This work is connected to the scientifi c program of the “Development of quality-oriented 
and harmonized R+D+I strategy and functional model at BME” project, supported by the New 
Széchenyi Plan (Project ID: TÁMOP-4.2.1/B-09/1/KMR-2010-0002).This paper is based on the 
results of the research underlying the author’s book entitled “EU and US Competition Law: Divided 
in Unity?”, published by Ashgate Publishing in 2013.
1 In this paper, the term resale price fi xing or RPF will be used to designate fi xed and minimum 
resale prices. Resale price maintenance (RPM) has been the traditional designation of supplier 
practices concerning resale prices, however, in both EU and US antitrust law, maximum and 
recommended resale prices are subject to effects-analysis and normally lawful; hence, in the 
scholarship the controversy focuses on fi xed and minimum resale prices. The approaches of US 
antitrust and EU competition law regarding maximum resale price fi xing and recommended resale 
prices roughly coincide. The latter two kinds of arrangements are to be examined under the rule of 
reason in US antitrust law, while in EU competition law they are declared lawful if neither the 
supplier’s, nor the buyer’s market share exceeds 30% and even above this threshold they can be 
condemned only if they have anti-competitive effects. For US law see United State v Colgate & Co., 
250 U.S. 300 (1919); Albrecht v Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). For EU law see Article 3 of 
Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. OJ 
[2010] L 102/1. (BER); Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard 
Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353.
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In 2007, in Leegin,2 a highly divided Supreme Court, in a four-to-fi ve judgment, 
overruled the century old per se illegality of RPF (established in Dr. Miles);3 from this on, 
RPF is to be scrutinized under the rule of reason. It is to be added that US antitrust law 
tempered the treatment of RPF long before Leegin: the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Monsanto4 (1984) effectively enabled producers to maintain prices by establishing that the 
concept of RPF-agreement does not cover situations where a producer terminates price-
cutters because of discounting, even if this happens after non-discounting dealers’ 
complaining to the producer.
In the EU, the regulatory regime of vertical restraints was revised in 2010: a new 
block exemption regulation (BER)5 and new Guidelines on Vertical Restraints6 were 
adopted. Nonetheless, the policy towards RPF, in essence, did not see a considerable 
change: the per se condemnation under Article 101(1) TFEU7 was maintained, while the 
new BER–similarly to the old one–excludes agreements involving RPF from the benefi t of 
the block exemption. Albeit the new Guidelines set out that, though it is improbable, RPF-
agreements might meet the conditions of individual exemption under Article 101(3),8 
theoretically, this has always been possible, and still, no formal decision has ever granted an 
individual exemption to RPF.
The economic literature reveals how complicate the economic evaluation of RPF is. 
Asking categorically whether RPF is effi cient or not (good or not from an economic point 
of view) is like asking the childish question: are white horses faster than black horses? RPF 
is sometimes effi cient, sometimes not; like white horses are sometimes faster than black 
horses and sometimes not. Actually, it was this “it depends” characteristic that led the 
Supreme Court in Leegin to overrule the per se illegality of RPF. The economic scholarship 
is replete with theories against RPF (e.g. dealer-cartel,9 manufacturer cartel,10 exclusion of 
the emergence of new cost-effective methods of distribution11) and for RPF (e.g. dealer 
2 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).
3 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373. (1911).
4 Monsanto Co. v Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762–763 (1984).
5 Article 3 of the BER.
6 Guidelines on vertical restraints. OJ [2010] C 130/1. (Guidelines on Vertical Restraints).
7 Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, hereafter Article 
101(1). Before 1 December 2009, the number of this Article was Article 81(1), and before 1 May 
1999 it was Article 81(1). In this paper, the new numbers introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 
(applicable as from 1 December 2009) are used, including the texts of the quotations.
8 Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, hereafter: Article 
101(3). Before 1 December 2009, the number of this Article was Article 81(3), and before 1 May 
1999 it was Article 81(3). In this paper, the new numbers introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 
(applicable as from 1 December 2009) are used, including the texts of the quotations.
9 See Posner, R. A.: Antitrust Law. An economic perspective. Chicago, 1976. 148; Bork, R. H.: 
The antitrust paradox. A policy at war with itself. New York, 1978. 282.
10 See Hovenkamp, H.: Federal Antitrust Policy. The law of competition and its practice. St. 
Paul, 1999. 443–445.
11 See Peeperkorn, L.: Resale Price Maintenance and its Alleged Effi ciencies. European 
Competition Journal, 4 (2008) 1, 208.
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service,12 protecting different channels of distribution,13 quality certifi cation,14 tackling 
distribution risks attached to uncertain demand15).
It is needless to rehearse these here;16 however, some fundamental propositions may be 
extracted. First, while, in general, it is more probable than not that RPF has anti-competitive 
effects, RPF is not always or almost always anticompetitive. Second, only the careful 
analysis of the intricacies of the case may reveal whether the anti- or the pro-competitive 
effects are prevalent. Third, one of the basic rules of thumb is that RPF may not raise 
concerns if there is no market power (in practical terms: if the market share is low); in such 
cases there is a strong presumption for the absence of competitive harm and for the 
enhancement of competition. Fourth, the empirical evidence concerning RPF is very scarce 
but the available surveys suggest that horizontal collusion is not prevalent in cases involving 
resale price fi xing.17
The purpose of this paper is to analyse and evaluate, from a comparative perspective 
and in the context of the recent developments of US antitrust, the treatment of RPF in EU 
competition law.
12 See Telser, L. G.: Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? Journal of Law and 
Economics, 3 (1960), 86. Cf. Bowman, W.: The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance. 
University of Chicago Law Review, 22 (1955), 825; Yamey, B. S.: The Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance. London, 1954. Contra Grimes, W.: Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: 
Vertical Price Restraints Revisited. California Law Review, 80 (1992), 1015. (Asserting that RPM 
may expose consumers to excessively aggressive promotion and makes them enter unwise purchases.)
13 See Shaffer, G.: Rendering Alternative Offerings Less Profi table with Resale Price 
Maintenance. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 3(4) (1995), 639. (Giving an 
explanation for RPM in cases where free-riding is not a problem.)
14 See Marvel, H. P.–McCafferty, S.: Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certifi cation. Rand 
Journal of Economics, 15 (1984) 3, 346.
15 Rey, P.–Tirole, J.: The Logic of Vertical Restraints. American Economic Review, 76 (1986), 
921; Gilbert, R. J.–Klemperer, P.: An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing (Working Paper, February 
1993); Marvel, H. P.: The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom. 
Antitrust Law Journal, 63 (1994), 73–77. (“RPM will thus be most desirable when without it retailers 
would be reluctant to hold adequate inventories for fear of dramatically lower prices in the event of 
low demand. This explanation for RPM is most compelling when demand is highly variable and when 
inventories are either perishable or costly to hold over to future demand periods.”); Deneckere, R.–
Marvel. H. P.–Peck, J.: Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance (Working 
Paper, Ohio State University, June 1994). 
16 For an overview on these see Nagy, Cs. I.: A viszonteladási ár rögzítésének megítélése az 
amerikai, az EU és a magyar versenyjogban: kihasznált és kihagyott lehetőségek. (The view of resale 
price fi xing in the U.S., the EU and the Hungarian competition law: utilized and missed opportunities.) 
In: Verseny és Szabályozás 2011 (eds: Valentiny, P.–Kiss, F. L.–Nagy, Cs. I.). Budapest, 2012. 59–69.
17 See Ostlund, H. J.–Vickland, C. R.: Fair Trade and the Retail Drug Store (1940); Thomas 
Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence (Bureau of Econ., 
Fed. Trade Comm’n 1983), 80; Ippolito, P. M.: Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from 
Litigation. Journal of Law and Economics, 34 (1991), 263. See also Ornstein, S. I.: Resale Price 
Maintenance and Cartels. Antitrust Bulletin, 30 (1985), 401. (Concluding that hints of a cartel were 
present in less than a third of the RPF cases.); Kleit, A. N.: Effi ciencies without Economists: the Early 
Years of Resale Price Maintenance. Southern Economic Journal, 59 (1993), 597. (Reaching a similar 
conclusion regarding RPF’s use as a cartelization tool.)
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The paper’s fi rst part examines EU competition law’s approach towards RPF, including 
the recent developments entailed by the 2010 rules on vertical restraints. The second part 
inquires whether, as to the treatment of RPF, EU competition law is in line with US antitrust 
after the changes introduced by the 2010 regulatory package. It is concluded that the treatment 
of RPF is far harsher in the EU than in the US. The third part evaluates the approach of EU 
competition law from a comparative perspective and concludes that the 2010 revision of the 
rules on vertical restraints somewhat refi ned but did not reform the law on RPF.
B) EU competition law on RPF after the 2010 revision–brave new world?
The EU competition law’s analysis of restrictive agreements is built up along the following 
questions:
– does the agreement violate Article 101(1),
– does it fall into the safe harbour of one of the block exemption regulations,
– does it benefi t from an individual exemption under Article 101(3)?
The new rules on vertical restraints left the answers to the fi rst two questions 
untouched; as amplifi ed below, only the treatment under Article 101(3) was slightly refi ned 
(but not reformed).
As to the question whether the agreement falls foul of Article 101(1), i.e. does it 
restricts competition, the new rules leave the automatic condemnation of RPF under Article 
101(1) untouched: RPF keeps being regarded as anti-competitive by object, irrespective of 
market share and, hence, as per se violating Article 101(1).
As to the question of block exemption, the old provision was preserved word for word: 
RPF is regarded as a hardcore restraint and its inclusion in the distribution contract deprives 
the entire agreement of the benefi t of the block exemption. It is to be noted that RPF is not 
merely black-listed but it is hardcore. The difference between the two categories is that in 
case of a hardcore restraint the entire agreement loses the benefi t of the block exemption, 
while in case of black-listed restraints this loss is restricted to the stipulation concerned.
As to the question of individual exemption, the 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
completed the old provisions with a list of examples where RPF might be in conformity 
with Article 101(3). Theoretically, RPF has never been outright excluded from the 
possibility to meet the requirements of Article 101(3), albeit there has been no formal 
decision granting individual exemption to it. The 2010 Guidelines complete this theoretical 
proposition with some general examples, where RPF may entail effi ciency benefi ts relevant 
from the perspective of Article 101(3).
I. RPF under Article 101(1): automatic condemnation preserved
EU competition law’s approach has always been very hostile towards RPF. Under EU 
law, while maximum resale price fi xing and recommended prices are not hardcore 
restrictions and are to be condemned only if they have anticompetitive effects,18 the fi xing 
18 The ECJ granted leave to a price recommendation system in Pronuptia holding that “although 
provisions which impair the franchisee’s freedom to determine his own prices are restrictive of 
competition, that is not the case where the franchisor simply provides franchisees with price 
guidelines, so long as there is no concerted practice between the franchisor and the franchisees or 
between the franchisees themselves for the actual application of such prices.” Case 161/84 Pronuptia 
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of concrete or minimum resale prices is anti-competitive by object under Article 101(1).19 
This means that RPF per se violates Article 101(1), irrespective of the market context. 
Besides the customary economic arguments against RPF, EU law’s approach has been 
infl uenced also by the purpose of market integration (single market imperative).20 RPF 
is often used as a tool to back a system of territorial protection by maintaining more or 
less uniform prices in different Member States, thus impeding the inter-state fl ow of 
goods.21
In SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et messageries de la pressem,22 in an Article 234 
reference, the ECJ ruled that RPF agreements “constitute, of themselves, a restriction of 
competition”23 (i.e. they are anti-competitive by object).24 The automatic condemnation of 
RPF under Article 101(1) was confi rmed in SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne 
SC.25 In Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis26 the ECJ 
subjected recommended prices to an effects-analysis but declared that RPF is regarded 
automatically as restrictive.27 In accordance with this judicial practice, the Commission’s 
decisional practice is replete with cases where the anti-competitive nature of RPF was 
de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis ECR [1986] 353, para 25. The ECJ has not 
ruled on maximum resale prices, yet. Likewise, the Commission also takes a more relaxed view with 
regard to recommended prices and maximum price fi xing. See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 
paras 226–229; Case COMP/B-1/38348 Repsol CPP SA OJ [2004] C 258/03, paras 18–20.
19 See Gulati, B.: Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Agreements–and the Dilemma Continues. 
The Competition Law Review, 8 (2012) 2, 133; Kneepkens, M.: Resale Price Maintenance: Economics 
Call for a More Balanced Approach. European Competition Law Review, 28 (2007) 12, 656. (Stating 
that in practice RPF is “subject to a per se prohibition.”)
20 See Korah, V.–O’Sullivan, D.: Distribution Agreements under the EC Competition Rules. 
Oxford, 2002. 105; Ritter, L.–Braun, W. D.: European Competition Law: a Practitioner’s Guide. The 
Hague, 2005. 269–270; Alese, F.: Unmasking the Masquerade of Vertical Price Fixing. European 
Competition Law Review, 28 (2007) 9, 525.
21 As shown by several Commission decisions. See e.g.77/66/EEC GERO-fabriek OJ [1977] L 
16/8, para II(3)(c); 2002/190/EC JCBOJ [2002] L 69/1, paras 168–172.
22 Case 243/83 SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et messageries de la pressem [1985] ECR 2015.
23 Or as the authentic French version of the judgment says: “sont en elles-memes restrictives de 
concurrence”.
24 The ECJ held that RPF comes under Article 101(1)(a) “directly or indirectly fi x purchase or 
selling prices or any other trading conditions”. Para 44 (“[P]rovisions which fi x the prices to be 
observed in contracts with third parties constitute, of themselves, a restriction on competition within 
the meaning of Article 101(1) which refers to agreements which fi x selling prices as an example of an 
agreement prohibited by the Treaty.”).
25 Case 27/87 SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC [1988] ECR 1919, paras 12–
15. (Condemning the fi xing of the minimum ‘resale’ price in a technology transfer agreement 
concerning plant breeders’ rights.)
26 Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] 
ECR 353.
27 Para 25.
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established,28 and the “soft law” documents issued by the Commission also follow this 
approach.29
This approach was fully maintained in the 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Agreements.30
The judicial and decisional practice has been at fault for a comprehensive explanation 
on why RPF is treated as anti-competitive by object, albeit some hints were given. One 
reason could be the elimination of intra-brand price competition; in SPRL Louis Erauw-
Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC, the ECJ referred to the dealer-cartel theory.31
The Commission’s 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints contain a detailed list of the 
competition risks resale price fi xing may bring forth:32 fi rst, it may facilitate collusion 
between suppliers, second, it may facilitate collusion between dealers, third, “it may more 
generally soften competition between manufacturers and/or between retailers”, fourth, “the 
immediate effect of RPM will be that all or certain distributors are prevented from lowering 
their sales price for that particular brand”, fi fth, “it may lower the pressure on the margin of 
the manufacturer, in particular where the manufacturer has a commitment problem”, sixth, 
28 73/322/EEC Deutsche Philips GmbH OJ [1973] L 293/40, para 2(b); 77/66/EEC GERO-
fabriek OJ [1977] L 16/8, para II(3)(c) (Here RPF was also used as a device to partition the common 
market.); 80/1333/EEC Hennessy-Henkell OJ [1980] L 383/11, para 20 (Asserting that RPF “has the 
object of limiting (…) [the distributor’s] freedom to fi x resale prices, prevents the exclusive dealer 
from fi xing them freely on the basis of the conditions obtaining on the market.”); 97/123/EC 
Novalliance/Systemform OJ [1996] L 47/11, para 101; 2001/135/EC Nathan-Bricolux OJ [2001] L 
54/1, para 72 (Expressly characterizing RPF as anti-competitive by object.); 2002/190/EC JCBOJ 
[2002] L 69/1, paras 168–172 (Here RPF was also used as a device to partition the market.); Case 
COMP/37.975 PO/Yamaha Commission decision of 16.07.2003 (unpublished but available at http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37975/en.pdf), paras 88, 127, 137, 144 and 155–
156 (Designating RPF as restrictive by object and “obvious restriction of competition.”); 2001/711/
EC Volkswagen OJ [2001] L 262/14, paras 71 and 74 (Sating the there was no need to show effects as 
RPF is anti-competitive by object.); 2001/135/EC Nathan-Bricolux OJ [2001] L 54/1, paras 86 and 88 
(Designating RPF as restrictive by object.). This approach was taken by the Commission from the 
beginning of EU competition law. See Korah, V.–O’Sullivan, D.: Distribution Agreements under the 
EC Competition Rules. Oxford, 2002. 105–106.
29 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. OJ [2004] C 101/97. para 23 
(Guidelines on Article 101(3)); Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not 
appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (de minimis). OJ [2001] C 368/13. para 11(2) (Notice on Agreements of Minor 
Importance).
30 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, paras 48 and 223.
31 Case 27/87 SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC [1988] ECR 1919, para 15 
(Asserting that the parallel employment of RPF clauses in different agreements entails that “those 
agreements have the same effects as a price system fi xed by a horizontal agreement.”).
32 Contrary to the Old Guidelines on Vertical Restraints of 2000 (Guidelines on vertical 
restraints. OJ [2000] C 291/1.) that failed to demonstrate with compelling arguments that RPF is 
‘always or almost always’ anti-competitive and, in para 112, pointed only to two main negative 
effects: “(1) a reduction in intra-brand price competition, and (2) increased transparency on prices. 
(…) Increased transparency on price and responsibility for price changes makes horizontal collusion 
between manufacturers or distributors easier, at least in concentrated markets. The reduction in intra-
brand competition may, as it leads to less downward pressure on the price for the particular goods, 
have as an indirect effect a reduction of inter-brand competition.”
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it “may be implemented by a manufacturer with market power to foreclose smaller rivals”, 
seventh, RPF “may reduce dynamism and innovation at the distribution level”.33
It is welcome that the Commission in the 2010 Guidelines got rid of the argument that 
one of the main risks of RPF is that it reduces intra-brand competition;34 intra-brand 
competition has no independent signifi cance if inter-brand competition is effective.
While RPF agreements may bring forth all the above repercussions, they do not 
necessarily bring them forth. By way of example, price-transparency-induced horizontal 
concerns emerge only if RPF is widely practiced in the industry and the market is susceptible 
of tacit coordination; as far as the risk of price increase is concerned, RPF relates to the 
price of a particular brand and not to the market price; hence, the increase of the market 
price is not necessary. All in all, these examples suggest that RPF is not always risky but it 
may raise concerns under certain circumstances. Accordingly, the circumstances of the case 
at stake must be taken into account in order to ascertain whether these potential negative 
effects are, indeed, present.
II. RPF in the block-exemption regulations
All block exemption regulations on vertical agreements, unequivocally, characterize RPF as 
hardcore and exclude it from the safe harbour of the block exemption. It is to be noted that 
resale price fi xing may be accomplished both directly and indirectly (through practices 
having tantamount effects).35
Article 4 of the 2010 BER repeats the Old BER’s36 provision and characterizes RPF as 
hardcore, depriving it of the benefi t of the block exemption.
33 Para 224.
34 Cf. Old Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para 112.
35 It is essential to stress that in EU competition law RPM also covers resale price maintenance 
“achieved through indirect means.” Guidelines on Vertical Restrains, para 48 (“However, RPM can 
also be achieved through indirect means. Examples of the latter are an agreement fi xing the 
distribution margin, fi xing the maximum level of discount the distributor can grant from a prescribed 
price level, making the grant of rebates or reimbursement of promotional costs by the supplier subject 
to the observance of a given price level, linking the prescribed resale price to the resale prices of 
competitors, threats, intimidation, warnings, penalties, delay or suspension of deliveries or contract 
terminations in relation to observance of a given price level. Direct or indirect means of achieving 
price fi xing can be made more effective when combined with measures to identify price-cutting 
distributors, such as the implementation of a price monitoring system, or the obligation on retailers to 
report other members of the distribution network that deviate from the standard price level. Similarly, 
direct or indirect price fi xing can be made more effective when combined with measures which may 
reduce the buyer’s incentive to lower the resale price, such as the supplier printing a recommended 
resale price on the product or the supplier obliging the buyer to apply a most-favoured-customer 
clause. The same indirect means and the same ‘supportive’ measures can be used to make maximum 
or recommended prices work as RPM. However, the use of a particular supportive measure or the 
provision of a list of recommended prices or maximum prices by the supplier to the buyer is not 
considered in itself as leading to RPM.”). See Case 86/82 Hasselblad (GB) Limited v Commission 
[1984] ECR 883, para 49 (In this case a clause enabled the producer to control dealers’ advertisements 
as regards selling prices and empowered it to prohibit such advertisements.).
36 Regulation 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. OJ [1999] L 336/21. (Old BER).
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The exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not apply to vertical agreements which, 
directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of 
the parties, have as their object:
(a) the restriction of the buyer’s ability to determine its sale price, without prejudice to 
the possibility of the supplier to impose a maximum sale price or recommend a sale price, 
provided that they do not amount to a fi xed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure 
from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties.
Article 4 of the MVBER37 repeats the above provision regarding the motor vehicle 
sector.
Hardcore restrictions
1. The exemption shall not apply to vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, in 
isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as 
their object:
(a) the restriction of the distributor’s or repairer’s ability to determine its sale price, 
without prejudice to the supplier’s ability to impose a maximum sale price or to 
recommend a sale price, provided that this does not amount to a fi xed or minimum sale 
price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties.
The same language is used in Article 4(2)(a) of the TTBER.38
2. Where the undertakings party to the agreement are not competing undertakings, the 
exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not apply to agreements which, directly or 
indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the 
parties, have as their object:
(a) the restriction of a party’s ability to determine its prices when selling products to 
third parties, without prejudice to the possibility of imposing a maximum sale price or 
recommending a sale price, provided that it does not amount to a fi xed or minimum 
sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties.
III. RPF under Article 101(3): the chances of an individual exemption
If an agreement falls foul of Article 101(1), and is not covered by a block exemption, it may 
still escape competition law condemnation if meeting the requirements of Article 101(3). 
The General Court declared in Matra Hachette “that, in principle, no anti-competitive 
practice can exist which, whatever the extent of its effects on a given market, cannot be 
37 Regulation 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector. OJ [2002] L 
203/30 (MVBER). It is to be noted that the New MVBER (Regulation 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector. OJ [2010] L 129/52). extended 
the scope of the BER to the motor vehicle aftermarket (purchase, sale or resale of spare parts for 
motor vehicles and provision of repair and maintenance services for motor vehicles), while the 
MVBER remains applicable to the purchase, sale and resale of new motor vehicles until 31 May 
2013.
38 Regulation 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of technology transfer agreements. OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, 11–17 (TTBER).
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exempted, provided that all the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) of the Treaty are 
satisfi ed”.39 Nonetheless, both the judicial and decisional practice,40 as well as the 
Commission’s “soft law” instruments41 suggest that Article 101(3) is a theoretically always, 
39 Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette SA v Commission [1994] ECR II-595, para 85. See also 
Guidelines on Article 101(3), para 46 (“Article 101(3) does not exclude a priori certain types of 
agreements from its scope. As a matter of principle all restrictive agreements that fulfi l the four 
conditions of Article 101(3) are covered by the exception rule.”). See also Case C-209/07 Competition 
Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd 
[2008] ECR I-8637, paras 21 and 39.
40 In Hennessy-Henkell, the Commission considered that although the exclusivity would 
encourage the distributor to invest thus ensuring a wider distribution of the products, it asserted that 
the fi xing of the resale price by the German distributor deprived the exclusivity of the chance to be 
exempted under Article 101(3), as the fi xed prices forestalled that the benefi ts resulting from the 
improvements in distribution introduced by the exclusivity would be passed on to the consumers. 
80/1333/EEC Hennessy-Henkell OJ [1980] L 383/11, paras 28, 30 and 32 (“For such improvement to 
be effective, however, the exclusive dealer would have to be able to fi x resale prices freely on the 
basis of the cost price of the products purchased from the manufacturer and by adapting his profi t 
margin to the sales policy determined by him on the basis of the conditions obtaining on the market. 
This requirement is essential if Hennessy products are to penetrate the German market better, and to 
combat competition from other brands.”) (“Nor can it be concluded that a fair share of the benefi ts 
which could result from exclusive distribution is being set aside for consumers. An improvement in 
distribution should be accompanied, particularly, by a reduction in sales prices to consumers, whereas 
(...) [the distributor] is not free to take a decision on this, and it is clear from the manner in which the 
agreement has been applied that Hennessy has prevailed upon Henkell to fi x higher prices than those 
which ought to have ensued from the agreement.”) (“By contrast, the restriction of the 
concessionnaire’s freedom to fi x his resale prices, contained in Article 6, cannot be regarded as 
indispensable to the attainment of the objectives of the agreement, even if the products in question are 
considered, as Hennessy considers them, to be luxury products.”) The Commission also refused the 
argument that RPF was necessary for preserving the luxurious image of the brand. The Commission 
apparently proceeded from the proposition that the chief benefi t of the improvement of distribution 
could be the decrease of the price of the product in question and RPF is by its very nature incapable of 
producing such effects. In Yamaha the Commission used a very unconditional language characterizing 
both RPF and absolute territorial protection as arrangements that cannot meet the requirements of 
Article 101(3) by their very nature; a language going far beyond the fact pattern of the case. Case 
COMP/37.975 PO/Yamaha Commission decision of 16.07.2003 (unpublished but available at http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37975/en.pdf), para 175 (“The Agreements in 
question were not notifi ed. If such agreements had been notifi ed, they could not have been exempted 
individually from the application of Article 101(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA 
Agreement, since the conditions necessary for granting an exemption are not met due to the nature of 
the restrictions of competition. Territorial protection and resale price maintenance are hardcore 
restrictions that do not meet the cumulative conditions of Article 101(3) of the Treaty and Article 
53(3) of the EEA Agreement. They do not contribute to improving the production or, in this case, the 
distribution of goods, nor are consumers allowed a share of the resulting benefi t.”).
41 Guidelines on Article 101(3), paras 46 and 79 (“However, severe restrictions of competition 
are unlikely to fulfi l the conditions of Article 101(3). Such restrictions are usually black-listed in 
block exemption regulations or identifi ed as hardcore restrictions in Commission guidelines and 
notices. Agreements of this nature generally fail (at least) the two fi rst conditions of Article 101(3). 
They neither create objective economic benefi ts nor do they benefi t consumers. (…) Moreover, these 
types of agreements generally also fail the indispensability test under the third condition.”) 
(“Restrictions that are black listed in block exemption regulations or identifi ed as hardcore restrictions 
in Commission guidelines and notices are unlikely to be considered indispensable.”).
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practically almost never open haven for agreements containing RPF.42 This proposition 
remained valid also after the adoption of the 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 
although these do contain the siren song of a substantial analysis.
The fi xing of concrete or minimum resale prices has only an improbable chance to 
meet the requirements of individual exemption under Article 101(3).43 The perspective for 
the latter is, in short, theoretically always, practically almost never realistic:44 theoretically, 
all agreements, including vertical covenants fi xing the resale price, are fi t for individual 
exemption, whilst practically they are scarcely able to deserve it. Furthermore, the stance 
that RPF agreements automatically violate Article 101(1) with a theoretical and moderate 
chance for individual exemption under Article 101(3) is conceptually fl awed: while Article 
101(3) accommodates (productive) effi ciency arguments, all theories advocating RPF argue 
that it may enhance rivalry, which is a value to be examined under Article 101(1).
In SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et messageries de la pressem,45 interestingly, the ECJ 
did not say that it would be highly unlikely for RPF to fulfi l the conditions of Article 101(3) 
but ruled that the Commission was to take account of the factors mentioned by the 
undertaking concerned.46 Nevertheless, it is rather doubtful whether any relevant conclusion 
could be extracted from the neutral language of the judgment. At all events, until the entry 
into force of Regulation 1/2003/EC on 1 May 2004, the Commission had monopoly over the 
application of Article 101(3),47 and it had never ever granted individual exemption to an 
RPF covenant.48 Subsequently, the application of EU competition law, including Article 
42 See Korah, V.–O’Sullivan, D.: Distribution Agreements under the EC Competition Rules. 
Oxford, 2002. 233. (Noting that “[i]n brief, although Matra Hachette suggests that no restriction of 
competition is beyond exemption, there appears to be no real possibility of redeeming the so-called 
‘hardcore’ restraints, and their inclusion in any distribution arrangement–even one which would 
otherwise satisfy the conditions for exemption under Regulation 2790/99–exposes the parties to 
serious risk of fi nes and nullity. Businesses would be well advised simply to avoid such restraints 
entirely.”)
43 Kneepkens, M.: Resale Price Maintenance: Economics Call for a More Balanced Approach. 
European Competition Law Review, 28 (2007) 12, 656. (Stating that in practice RPF is “subject to a 
per se prohibition.”)
44 See Jones, A.: Resale Price Maintenance: a Debate about Competition Policy in Europe. 
European Competition Journal, 5 (2009) 2, 501–502.
45 Case 243/83 SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et messageries de la pressem, [1985] ECR 2015.
46 Para 46 (“If, in so far as the distribution of newspapers and periodicals is concerned, the 
fi xing of the retail price by publishers constitutes the sole means of supporting the fi nancial burden 
resulting from the taking back of unsold copies and if the latter practice constitutes the sole method 
by which a wide selection of newspapers and periodicals can be made available to readers, the 
Commission must take account of those factors when examining an agreement for the purposes of 
Article 101(3).”).
47 Regulation 17, Article 9(1).
48 See Whish, R.: Competition Law. Oxford, 2009. 637; Gulati, B.: Minimum Resale Price 
Maintenance Agreements–and the Dilemma Continues. The Competition Law Review, 8 (2012) 2, 
133. Nonetheless, the Commission in Volkswagen, while fi nding that the conditions of Article 101(3) 
were not met, refrained from condemning RPF in general (stressing that the requirements of an 
individual exemption were not met in this case) and seriously examined the justifi cations proffered by 
Volkswagen. 2001/711/EC Volkswagen OJ [2001] L 262/14, para 95 (“Resale price maintenance does 
not contribute to improving the production or (in this case) the distribution of goods. Although, 
according to Volkswagen AG, it is intended to improve the profi tability of German Volkswagen 
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101(3), was decentralized; nonetheless, it is scarcely conceivable that this provision would 
be interpreted otherwise in practice, especially as the formation of competition policy, 
contrary to enforcement, remained essentially centralized.
It is noteworthy that in Newspaper distribution contracts in Belgium–AMP the 
Commission did send a comfort letter (but not a formal decision!) for an RPF arrangement 
and expressly came to the conclusion that it met the requirements of Article 101(3).49 In this 
case it was the essential characteristic of the market that the products (newspapers and 
magazines) had an extremely short life-span and the scheme was based on a sale or return 
system. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the dealers in this case were possibly acting as 
agents, as they did not acquire title over the periodicals and all the risks of non-sale were 
borne by the producer. The Commission noted that “[i]t is therefore economically acceptable 
in the distribution system concerned that the operator who incurs the main economic risk 
should control the selling price.” This circumstance may have infl uenced the Commission’s 
analysis considerably. It is to be noted that under EU competition, similarly to US antitrust,50 
law agency agreements, normally, fall outside the scope of Article 101(1). “The determining 
factor in defi ning an agency agreement for the application of Article 101(1) is the fi nancial 
or commercial risk borne by the agent in relation to the activities for which it has been 
appointed as an agent by the principal.”51
The new rules introduced by the 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints expressly 
highlight that albeit the hardcore restrictions enumerated in Article 4 of the BER, including 
resale price fi xing and minimum resale price fi xing, are presumed to violate Article 101(1) 
and not to meet the conditions of Article 101(3), this presumption is rebuttable, and the 
parties may have an improbable but not unrealistic chance to survive on the basis of 
individual exemption.52 Although the inclusion of RPF into the agreement “gives rise to the 
presumption that the agreement is unlikely to fulfi l the conditions of Article 101(3)”, the 
“undertakings have the possibility to plead an effi ciency defence under Article 101(3) in an 
dealers and help them attain or maintain the standards of service prescribed by Volkswagen AG, and 
hence could, according to this argument, contribute to safeguarding as many dealerships as possible, 
there is no evidence to suggest that safeguarding individual dealerships which under normal 
competitive conditions would not be viable would appreciably improve the distribution of goods or 
that this alleged improvement might offset the disadvantages of the restriction of competition. 
Furthermore, there is not the slightest guarantee that the larger profi ts earned by Volkswagen dealers 
as a result of their refusing to grant discounts on the purchase of new VW Passat cars will be used to 
safeguard dealerships.”)
49 Cases IV/C-2/31.609 and 37.306, XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 161 (1999).
50 See United States v Arnold Schwinn Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 & 3101 (1967).
51 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para 13.
52 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para 47 (“The Block Exemption Regulation contains in 
Article 4 a list of hardcore restrictions which lead to the exclusion of the whole vertical agreement 
from the scope of application of the Block Exemption Regulation. Including such a hardcore 
restriction in an agreement gives rise to the presumption that the agreement falls within Article 101(1). 
It also gives rise to the presumption that the agreement is unlikely to fulfi l the conditions of Article 
101(3), for which reason the block exemption does not apply. However, undertakings have the 
possibility to demonstrate pro-competitive effects under Article 101(3) in an individual case. In case 
the undertakings substantiate that likely effi ciencies result from including the hardcore restriction in 
the agreement and that in general all the conditions of Article 101(3) are fulfi lled, this will require the 
Commission to effectively assess the likely negative impact on competition before making the 
ultimate assessment of whether the conditions of Article 101(3) are fulfi lled.”).
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individual case.”53 Until this point the 2010 Guidelines, essentially, do not depart from the 
Old Guidelines of 2000: it has always been possible to plead an effi ciency defence under 
Article 101(3). This possibility remains also under the 2010 Guidelines highly exceptional, 
which is, notwithstanding the above theoretical contingencies, to be regarded as practically 
prohibited.
The foregoing proposition is underpinned by the conceptual placement of the treatment 
of RPF, i.e. it is to be analysed under Article 101(3). The uncertainty entailed by this is 
boosted by the BER, which does not simply black-list RPF but pronounces it to be hardcore. 
Namely, if an agreement contains a black-listed clause (as enumerated in Article 5 of the 
BER), the agreement itself does not lose the block exemption but this exclusion is limited 
to the incriminated contractual provision. On the other hand, if an agreement contains a 
hardcore restraint (as enumerated in Article 4), the entire agreement loses the block 
exemption’s safe harbour. Accordingly, the enterprise testing RPF under Article 101(3) risks 
not simply the RPF clause but the entire distribution agreement’s competition law 
compliance.
The virtual novelty of the 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints is that they provide 
examples on when RPF could meet the requirements of Article 101(3); they list three cases 
where effi ciency benefi ts may be present. First, RPF may be an effi cient means of 
introducing and promoting a new product:
Most notably, where a manufacturer introduces a new product, RPM may be helpful 
during the introductory period of expanding demand to induce distributors to better 
take into account the manufacturer’s interest to promote the product. RPM may 
provide the distributors with the means to increase sales efforts and if the distributors 
on this market are under competitive pressure this may induce them to expand overall 
demand for the product and make the launch of the product a success, also for the 
benefi t of consumers.54
It is to be stressed that the footnote attached to the above provides that the supplier 
may resort to RPF only if it is not practical to impose on all dealers effective promotion 
requirements by contract.
Second, a coordinated short-term low price campaign in a franchise system or similar 
distribution system applying a uniform distribution format may also justify the application 
of “fi xed resale prices, and not just maximum resale prices”.55
Third, pre-sales services, especially in case of experience or complex products, may 
also justify RPF, if necessary for tackling the free-rider problem.
In some situations, the extra margin provided by RPM may allow retailers to provide 
(additional) pre-sales services, in particular in case of experience or complex products. 
If enough customers take advantage from such services to make their choice but then 
purchase at a lower price with retailers that do not provide such services (and hence do 
not incur these costs), high-service retailers may reduce or eliminate these services that 
enhance the demand for the supplier’s product. RPM may help to prevent such free-
53 Para 223.
54 Para 225.
55 Para 225.
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riding at the distribution level. The parties will have to convincingly demonstrate that 
the RPM agreement can be expected to not only provide the means but also the 
incentive to overcome possible free riding between retailers on these services and that 
the pre-sales services overall benefi t consumers as part of the demonstration that all 
the conditions of Article 101(3) are fulfi lled.56
Notwithstanding the 2010 Guidelines’ above siren song, it is expected that the fi xing of 
the resale prices and minimum resale prices will remain rather risky from a competition law 
point of view, without having any secure leaning as to when it may be practiced. Namely, 
the burden on undertakings pleading an effi ciency defence under Article 101(3) is extremely 
high and, besides the above three examples, the 2010 Guidelines seem to offer only a little 
more than what was offered by the Old Guidelines of 2000: RPF is unlikely to fulfi l the 
requirements of an individual exemption but theoretically this is possible. Accordingly, EU 
competition law saw only a minor refi nement and not a comprehensive reform.
C) Is EU competition law in line with US antitrust after the 2010 review of the rules 
on vertical restrains?
It has always been tempting to equate the treatment of RPF under EU law with the rule of 
reason analysis of US antitrust; after the 2010 Guidelines it could be argued that this is a 
fortiori true: RPF, theoretically, has always been capable of meeting the requirements of 
Article 101(3), and this was made express in the 2010 Guidelines. It is unquestionable that 
there is a certain parallel in the sense that the rule of reason implies a substantive analysis, 
while RPF is not outright excluded from the possibility to benefi t from Article 101(3). 
However, putting an equality sign between the rule of reason analysis envisaged by the 
Supreme Court in Leegin and the Article 101(3) scrutiny of RPF is like saying that monkeys 
and horses are completely the same because both have four legs and eat grass! The 
divergence between the rules of reason and the Article 101(3) analysis can be traced back to 
two principal reasons.
First, under EU law, the concept of “agreement” embraces a much wider range of 
supplier practices than in US antitrust. In US antitrust, due to the Supreme Court’s judgment 
in Monsanto in 1984, breaking off business relations with a dealer because of non-
compliance with the producer’s pricing expectations is not an agreement on prices, even if 
the foregoing occurs after the complaining of a rival dealer. On the other hand, in EU law, it 
is highly risky if the producer discusses pricing issues with the distributor and puts pressure 
on it. Second, the rule of reason and the Article 101(3) analysis differ considerably as 
regards the allocation of the burden of proof and the standard of proof. As a matter practice, 
the full-blown analysis under the rule of reason and the restricted scrutiny under Article 
101(3) diverge very signifi cantly.
While in US antitrust law the per se illegality of RPF was utterly abolished in Leegin 
(in 2007), in Monsanto (in 1984) the Supreme Court confi ned the application of per se 
illegality to agreements that relate positively to the resale price, i.e. prior announcements to 
terminate in case of discounting, communication between the producer and non-discounting 
dealers and agreements to terminate the price-cutter were not covered by per se illegality. 
56 Para 225.
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Accordingly, the virtual divergence between US antitrust and EU competition law, in this 
regard, started 23 years before Leegin.
The permissive approach followed by US antitrust law as to tacit agreements may be 
explained with the tradition-based Colgate doctrine57 and the favourable position taken 
regarding intra-brand vertical restraints; the latter had remarkable infl uence on the way the 
term “agreement” was defi ned in vertical cases.
EU competition law contains two theories for condemning vertical tacit agreements: 
“continuous business relationship” and “tacit acquiescence (assent)”.58 Pursuant to the old 
reading of the fi rst theory, if there is a permanent business relationship between the parties, 
even a genuine unilateral producer declaration may become part of the parties’ vertical 
relationship, thus, coming within the purview of Article 101.59 In Volkswagen,60 EU courts 
refused the old reading and took a defi nite stance establishing that the “continuous business 
relationship” theory works only if the framework distribution agreement virtually authorizes 
the producer to render certain decisions and make them part of the parties’ business 
relationship. Though no express authorization is required, the power conferred on the 
producer should not be visionary.
The second theory of EU competition law, i.e. “tacit acquiescence (assent)”, has its 
counter-part in US antitrust. Nevertheless, in the latter the concept of tacit acquiescence 
has a rather limited scope and signifi cance. In EU law, partially due to the long-lasting 
reign of the approach that grasped the “continuous business relationship” theory as one 
requiring only visionary authorization, there has been no coercive need to elaborate the 
theory of tacit acquiescence; indeed, cases interpreting this theory are quite rare. Thus, 
several questions of interpretation are still open. One thing remains certain: silence infers 
no consent. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether actual distributor compliance attached 
to the producer’s call reveals an agreement according to Article 101. The ECJ’s Volkswagen 
judgment suggests an affi rmative answer. On the other hand, in US antitrust, the actual 
compliance of the dealers does not implicate an agreement. According to the Colgate 
doctrine, a producer is free to announce in advance the behaviour he expects from the 
dealers and to terminate non-complying traders. The fact that almost all dealers act in 
conformity with the producer’s contemplated strategy does not prove the existence of an 
57 United State v Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
58 Nagy, Cs. I.: A vertikális megállapodás mint a kartelltilalom küszöbfogalma: összehasonlító 
jogi elemzés és értékelés (The vertical agreements as the antitrust threshold concept: Comparative 
legal analysis and evaluation). Versenytükör, 7 (2011) 1, 20–35.
59 See Joined Cases 100 to 103/80 SA Musique Diffusion française and others v Commission 
[1983] ECR 1825, paras 79–80; Joined Cases 32/78, 36/78 to 82/78 BMW Belgium SA and others v 
Commission [1979] ECR 2435, paras 28–30; 107/82 Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-
Telefunken AG v Commission [1983] ECR 3151. paras 38–39 and 46; Joined Cases 25/84 and 26/84 
Ford–Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc. v Commission, [1985] ECR 2725. paras 6 and 20–25; Case 
C-277/87 Sandoz prodotti farmaceutici SpA v Commission [1990] ECR I-45; Joined Cases C-2/01 and 
C-3/01 Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and Commission v Bayer AG [2004] ECR 
I-23, paras 140 and 142. On the EU judicial practice see also Broberg, M.–Jakobsen, P. S.: The 
Concept of Agreement in Article 81 E.C.: on the Manufacturers’ Right to Prevent Parallel Trade 
within the European Community. European Competition Law Review, 23 (2002) 3, 128; Lianos, I.: 
Collusion in Vertical Relations under Article 81 EC. Common Market Law Review, 45 (2008), 1037.
60 Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707, on appeal Case C-338/00 
Volkswagen AG v Commission [2003] ECR I-9189.
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agreement. Post-Colgate case-law made it clear that not only public but also private 
communication having concrete addressees may come under the immunity of unilateralism; 
what is more, recurrent warnings may also avoid Section 1 scrutiny if their frequency, 
intensity and the subsequent conduct of the dealer do not result in a coerced agreement.61
Not only embraces the EU concept of agreement a much wider range of supplier 
practices but, as noted above, the Article 101(3) analysis is, in numerous regards, more 
burdensome for the defendant than the rule of reason. It is submitted that after Leegin the 
two regimes are far from being in line with each other, notwithstanding the fact that the 
European approach towards RPF is said to have changed and a “full-blown” inquiry is 
promised under Article 101(3).
First, under the rule of reason the plaintiff has to show a prima facie case (competitive 
harm or market power);62 on the other hand, in EU competition law RPF is a per se violation 
of Article 101(1) and, hence, the burden of proof (the burden to prove that the conditions of 
Article 101(3) are met) automatically shifts on the defendant. Second, the inquiry of the 
justifi cations and the balancing of the pros and cons of RPF–taking into account the present 
conceptual location of RPF, which exiles it to Article 101(3)–are far more burdensome for 
defendants than the treatment they can expect on the other side of the Atlantic. Article 
101(3) focuses on (productive) effi ciency benefi ts, while the potential merit of RPF is that it 
may intensify rivalry. Furthermore, it is also to be taken into account that the status of 
justifi cations under the rule of reason and Article 101(3) is different. The application of the 
latter is almost, though not completely, exceptional, where the defendant faces a very high 
standard of proof and has to assume all uncertainties and risks of evaluation. What is more, 
a rather detailed set of substantiated and empirically verifi able evidence is to be submitted 
in order to succeed. On the other hand, in respect of the rule of reason, the general 
perception is that plausible and reasonably substantiated allegations of justifi cation can save 
the defendant.63 This may be due to the circumstance that in the US more than 90% of the 
antitrust matters are litigated in civil procedure where the usual standard of proof is 
preponderance of evidence (balance of probabilities) and this applies also to the proof of 
justifi cations. Finally, it is to be noted that in EU competition law there has been no formal 
decision grating leave to RPF under Article 101(3).
D) Conclusions and evaluation
Both US antitrust and EU competition law share the general proposition that the application 
of automatic condemnation should be restricted to practices that, due to their nature, are 
always or almost always anti-competitive without the perspective of a redeeming virtue. 
Economic theory shows that RPF is in several cases reasonably justifi able. Economic 
scholarship provides several examples where the producer’s endeavour to maintain prices is 
socially benefi cial because it enhances competition. Accordingly, the per se condemnation 
61 Frey & Son v Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 41 S.Ct. 451 (1921); Russell Stover 
Candies, Inc. v FTC, 718 F.2d 256, 257 (1983); Monsanto Co. v Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 
752 (1984); World of Sleep, Inc. v La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F. 2d 1467, 1475–1476 (1985).
62 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 
468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984); FTC v Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
63 Areeda, Ph.: The Rule of Reason–A Catechism on Competition. Antitrust Law Journal, 55 
(1986), 582.
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of RPF is not justifi ed, and those instances are to be singled out where there is no 
competitive harm, either because there are no anti-competitive repercussions (e.g. the 
market position of the parties is trivial) or because they are outweighed by pro-competitive 
effects (e.g. the RPF handles a market failure).
It is submitted that in EU competition law the main problem is that, conceptually, the 
question of RPF has been pushed in the pigeonhole of Article 101(3). While the latter is 
certainly the proper fl oor for measuring productive effi ciency arguments, several of the 
supporting theories of RPF stress that in some cases RPF may actually increase the intensity 
of competition in terms of rivalry. For instance, the enhanced services provided by the 
retailers may increase the demand for the product and thus trigger competitive pressure on 
competing products; producers may have access to distribution channels not available for 
them in the absence of RPF etc. These theories, in fact, argue that RPF increases rivalry but, 
by way of example, normally reveal no cost-savings. Another rule of thumb regarding RPF 
is that it cannot interfere with the proper functioning of the competitive process if there is 
no market power, an issue also belonging to the analysis under Article 101(1).
As the economic criticism against the present state of EU law and the impact of Leegin 
is growing, EU competition law is being compelled to address the problem of RPF. There is 
a danger (and this danger became a reality in the 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints) 
that the analysis of RPF will be forced into Article 101(3)’s bed of Procrustes,64 which is, 
however, not the proper fi eld of examining it. As noted above, Article 101(3) focuses, or 
rather should focus, on questions of (productive) effi ciency, while the vast majority of 
economic justifi cations for RPF assert that it increases rivalry, i.e. the intensity of 
competition. The currently effective BER and the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (both 
adopted in 2010) foreshadow this approach and seem to turn this danger into reality: while 
the new BER and the new Guidelines, similarly to the old ones, consider RPF as hardcore 
and anticompetitive by object, the 2010 Guidelines expressly encourage undertakings to test 
RPF agreements under Article 101(3) and declare that the exemptibility of such arrangements 
is an exceptional but not a completely unrealistic perspective. In other words, RPF as such 
is not per se illegal–a notion unknown for EU competition law anyway, since theoretically 
every agreement has the chance to meet the requirements of Article 101(3)–and it can be 
regarded as lawful if it fulfi ls the requirements of individual exemption.65 Nevertheless, this 
escape-hatch seems to drive RPF onto a fi eld where it cannot win the battle: Article 101(3) 
deals with productive effi ciency, a benefi t normally not attributed to RPF.
64 See Peeperkorn, L.: Resale Price Maintenance and its Alleged Effi ciencies. European 
Competition Journal, 4 (2008) 1, 204, 212. (Asserting that it can be argued that the hardcore approach 
of EU competition law is “in a way an application of what is described (…) [in Leegin] by the 
Supreme Court.”) (“One could conclude that the Leegin judgment provides the US authorities and 
courts with the possibility of applying the same policy towards RPM as is currently applied in the EU, 
though it remains to be seen how US policy will develop.”); Jones, A.: Resale Price Maintenance: a 
Debate about Competition Policy in Europe. European Competition Journal, 5 (2009) 2, 513. 
(Arguing that the Commission could be encouraged to consider the pro-competitive merits of RPM 
under Article 101(3).); Van Doorn, F.: Resale Price Maintenance in EC Competition Law: The Need 
for a Standardised Approach. (November 6, 2009) (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1501070), 1, 23–24.
65 Para 47 of the Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints encourages hardcore 
restrictions to try to meet the conditions of Article 101(3). This siren song is repeated specifi cally 
regarding RPF in para 223 of the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints.
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Although the 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints suggest that undertakings should 
test their RPF agreements under Article 101(3), the 2010 BER, inconsistently, discourages 
them from this: it maintains the approach of the Old BER of 1999 and it does not simply 
exclude RPF from the block exemption but regards it as hardcore. As noted above, if an 
agreement contains a black-listed clause (as enumerated in Article 5 of the BER), the 
agreement itself does not lose the block exemption but this exclusion is limited to the 
incriminated contractual provision. On the other hand, if an agreement contains a hardcore 
restraint (as enumerated in Article 4 of the BER), the entire agreement loses the block 
exemption’s safe harbour. Accordingly, testing an RPF clause under Article 101(3) risks not 
simply this clause but the entire distribution agreement, thus unnecessarily raising the 
stakes. If EU competition law really wanted to open the door to the substantive analysis of 
RPF, why was it not blacklisted (instead of being designated as hardcore)? Today, if an 
undertaking inserts RPF into a distribution agreement, it runs the risk of losing the block 
exemption for the entire agreement.
As noted above, one of the strongest arguments for RPF is that if implemented by a 
small supplier and it is not widespread in the industry (there are no cumulative effects), it is 
simply not capable of being harmful; an argument that does not fi t Article 101(3); on the 
other hand, this argument suggests that instead the Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance 
should be amended so as to cover agreements containing RPF if market share is low.66
The 2010 regulatory package of vertical restraints ignores the transaction costs and 
realities of competition assessment and balancing. The Article 101(3) assessment is very 
expensive and time-consuming, and defi nitely needs specialized expertise. If individual 
exemption under the notifi cation system amounted to a torture,67 this is the truer in respect 
of self-assessment under Article 101(3). Such resources normally pertain to big enterprises; 
nevertheless, these are the ones where a stringent RPF policy would be justifi ed. On the 
other hand, normally, the Article 101(3) assessment requires, subjectively, much higher 
efforts and induces, proportionally, higher transaction costs in case of undertakings the 
market power of which is smaller. Although it is normally the small enterprises that, due to 
the low market share, should be allowed to fi x the resale price, they are also the ones that 
shrink from the Article 101(3) assessment due to the high legal and analysis expenses. It is 
to be noted that legal costs emerge not only in the phase of the preliminary self-assessment 
but also in case a competition procedure is launched subsequently.
The status of (relative) territorial protection68 demonstrates the mistreatment of RPF. 
The most important argument for territorial protection is the free-rider theory. The story of 
66 The approach that RPFs of minor importance cannot raise competition concerns and are, 
hence, in accord with competition law appears, for instance, in Section 13 of the Hungarian 
Competition Act (Law No LVII of 1996), which regards RPF below 10% market share as de minimis 
and, thus, lawful.
67 See Whish, R.: Competition Law. Oxford, 2009. 114.
68 In order to distinguish absolute territorial protection (exclusivity) from relative territorial 
protection, the concept of active/passive sales was developed in EU competition law. A passive 
transaction is a sale for which the dealer made no efforts: these are the unsolicited orders addressed to 
it; on the other hand, active transactions are sales that are entailed by the distributor’s endeavours. 
Location clauses, areas of primary responsibility and restrictions on advertisements are considered as 
restraints on active sales. An outright prohibition on export, i.e. forbidding both active and passive 
sales, amounts to an absolute territorial protection, while the mere exclusion of active sales qualifi es 
as relative territorial protection. See Regulation 1983/83 OJ [1983] L 173/1, Article 2(2)(c) (The 
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the parasite dealer intruding in the fi eld cultivated by the local distributor and free-riding on 
its investments is so picturesque that EU competition law waives the claim to inquire in 
detail whether free-riding is a real problem in the particular case, whether the territorially 
competent trader would assume distributorship, whether it would take on the efforts and 
expenses of promotion on the optimal level or whether there would be under-investment. 
Here, competition law is satisfi ed with that it regards these restraints as lawful in the absence 
of market power (according to the BER under 30% market share), and presumes that they 
are justifi ed and follow a legitimate end. In other words, EU competition law accepts that in 
abstracto these restraints aim at tackling the free-rider problem and does not analyse 
whether this consideration is present in concreto. Several agreements involving territorial 
protection would fail if it were required to be proved in detail under Article 101(3) that the 
restraint’s purpose and actual effect is the tackling of the free-rider problem, the supplier 
would fi nd no trader to deal with the merchandise, the dealer would not be incited to 
promote the merchandise and, hence, there would be under-investment in the promotion 
efforts and, fi nally, there is no alternative and less restrictive method to handle free-riding.
Interestingly, while RPF is unexceptionally contrary to Article 101(1) and is to be 
analysed on a case-by-case basis, even absolute territorial protection (the biggest vertical 
evil of EU competition law) is granted an exception under Article 101(1). The 2010 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints provide that even an absolute territorial protection clause 
may be lawful for two years if it is necessary for penetrating a new market.69
All in all, the fact that there is a conceptual escape-hatch for RPF in the form of Article 
101(3) appears to be rather a disadvantage: in US antitrust law the compelling economic 
criticism concerning the status of RPF resulted in the comprehensive revision of the law; in 
EU competition law the perspective of such a fundamental re-thinking of the features and 
consequences of RPF seems to be delayed or even impeded by the opportunism enabled by 
Article 101(3). This is what the 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints seem to have done: 
only a minor refi nement, not a comprehensive reform.
regulation defi ned active sales as follows: “the obligation to refrain, outside the contract territory and 
in relation to the contract goods, from seeking customers, from establishing any branch, and from 
maintaining any distribution depot.”). See also Guidelines on Vertical Restrains, para 51 (“[T]he 
Commission interprets ‘active’ and ‘passive’ sales as follows: ‘Active’ sales mean actively approaching 
individual customers by for instance direct mail, including the sending of unsolicited e-mails, or 
visits; or actively approaching a specifi c customer group or customers in a specifi c territory through 
advertisement in media, on the internet or other promotions specifi cally targeted at that customer 
group or targeted at customers in that territory. Advertisement or promotion that is only attractive for 
the buyer if it (also) reaches a specifi c group of customers or customers in a specifi c territory, is 
considered active selling to that customer group or customers in that territory. ‘Passive’ sales mean 
responding to unsolicited requests from individual customers including delivery of goods or services 
to such customers. General advertising or promotion that reaches customers in other distributors’ 
(exclusive) territories or customer groups but which is a reasonable way to reach customers outside 
those territories or customer groups, for instance to reach customers in one’s own territory, are 
considered passive selling. General advertising or promotion is considered a reasonable way to reach 
such customers if it would be attractive for the buyer to undertake these investments also if they 
would not reach customers in other distributors’ (exclusive) territories or customer groups.”)
69 Para 61. A similar provision was included also in the Old Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 
para 119(10).
